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Abstract
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winnertake-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which
that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that
proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all
tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which
heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants, without altering the performance
of stronger entrants. These findings could inform the design of contests for technological and
other improvements, which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit
more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities.
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1. Introduction
Government agencies and philanthropic donors often sponsor contests to reward socially
desirable achievements, such as educational attainment or technological innovation.1
Policymakers can also influence the value of rewards in private contests, by taxing or regulating
the payoffs obtained from tournament-like competitions.2 In this paper, we use controlled
experiments to compare the degree of effort and achievement elicited by two contrasting
payment structures, in an otherwise identical contest with the same stakes. The vast majority of
previous work on contest payments focuses on winner-take-all or rank-order tournaments with
fixed prizes.3 Here, we contrast that traditional approach with an alternative contest design, in
which payments are strictly proportional to measured achievement.
Winner-take-all competition is widespread, often because achievement is inherently
indivisible or because the contest sponsor wishes to create strong effort incentives by providing
the greatest possible reward for winning. Examples include competitions for leadership
positions, medical discoveries, or athletic records. Lazear and Rosen (1981) predict that winnertake-all payments elicit greater maximum efforts when identical players pursue a fixed goal, but
some contests in real life aim to attract diverse contestants whose efforts are cumulative. For
example, a contest sponsor may wish to elicit greater educational achievement, environmental
conservation, or productivity gains. Such competitions are not inherently winner-take-all, and
their explicit goal may be to attract and reward the efforts of heterogeneous contestants.
Recent theoretical and experimental studies have identified several limitations of winner-

1

A comprehensive review of government and philanthropic contests is available from McKinsey and Company
(2009); a database of technology prizes is provided in Masters and Delbecq (2008).
2
Many governments impose special taxes on income above certain thresholds, and also directly regulate specific
kinds of contests. For example, attorneys in the United States can compete for contingency fees, but that type of
tournament is often prohibited elsewhere.
3
A review of this literature is provided in Falk and Fehr (2003) and Irlenbusch (2006).
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take-all tournaments that might lead contest sponsors to seek different designs (Lazear, 1999;
2000). Relative to piece rate wages, winner-take-all incentives may lead to greater variance in
effort by players (Bull et al., 1987; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Eriksson et al., 2009) or
sabotage among them (Munster, 2007; Chen, 2003; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008), and the
outcomes are also affected by heterogeneity among players (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992;
Harbring et al., 2007) as well as risk-sharing incentives (Krishna and Morgan, 1998). These
considerations may discourage players from entry and distort performance, and thus reduce the
total effort elicited in winner-take-all tournaments. Winner-take-all tournaments can also lead to
a more unequal distribution of income (Frank and Cook, 1996). Moldovanu and Sela (2001)
show that an alternative tournament design with multiple prizes elicits higher aggregate
performance when the cost of effort is convex. One of their predictions is tested in a mazesolving contest by Freeman and Gelber (2010), who find that the multiple-prize structure does
result in higher aggregate performance than the winner-take-all payment.4
This paper studies a new type of tournament: a proportional-prize contest, in which the
prize is divided among participants in proportion to their achievement.5 This type of contest
imitates some forms of competition among firms, for example, whose effort may be rewarded
through a share of industry profit. Shared prizes can also be awarded in lobbying contests, such
as the allocation of import quota licenses among competing importers (Krueger, 1974).
Proportional contests may also be used within firms to reward workers, or as a type of
procurement contract to elicit effort among suppliers. For example, poultry meat processors in
4

In a chosen effort experiment, Müller and Schotter (2007) also find a general support for the theory developed by
Moldovanu and Sela (2001). However, they find that low ability players drop out significantly more than predicted.
5
A proportional-prize tournament is in some ways similar to the type of contest modeled by Tullock (1980), in
which a contestant’s effort influences their probability of winning a fixed prize. Making the prize itself proportional
to effort allows us to separate risk concerns from contest design, as in Long and Vousden (1987), and allows direct
comparison of winner-take-all versus proportional payments. Contests with proportional prizes are also related to the
literature on profit sharing and labor productivity. For a review of this literature, see Weitzman and Kruse (1990).
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the United States use proportional-payment competitions among their suppliers to spur cost
reductions; Zheng and Vikuna (2007) study the case of one firm that switched to such contracts
in 1984, and estimate the resulting increase in performance compared to the rank-order contests
used previously.
Comparing contest designs could offer both positive and normative lessons. In terms of
positive economics, our results show differences in behavior under proportional as opposed to
winner-take-all incentives. On the normative side, our results could guide the design of
government-sponsored and philanthropic contests, including competitions for educational
achievement, health-care improvements, and many kinds of technological innovations. In a
review of the history of such contests, Masters and Delbecq (2008) suggest how proportional
payments could encourage innovation targeted at agricultural innovations for low-income
farmers, building on the opportunities sketched in Masters (2005). In general, contest sponsors
could use proportional payments whenever the contest objective can be measured in a cardinal
(rather than ordinal) manner. Where cardinal measurement is feasible, paying incrementally for
increased achievement uses all of the available information about relative performance. In
contrast, winner-take-all contests provide no incentives for any result other than winning.
The potential value of using proportional prizes is in some ways similar to offering
multiple prizes in a rank-order tournament, as studied by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Clark and
Riis (1998), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001). The main difference is that, instead of an
exogenously determined number of prizes and prize values, all players receive a payment which
is endogenously determined by their individual efforts. Making proportional payments is also in
some ways similar to the use of individual-specific handicaps to normalize incentives, as in
Dickinson and Isaac (1998). Here the main difference is that each contestant endogenously
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competes against the average of all other contestants, with no need for the contest designer to
evaluate entrants and impose handicaps.
In this paper, we compare the performance of winner-take-all and proportional-payment
contests in attracting entry and eliciting real efforts by actual contestants. Experiments that make
participation endogenous, such as those of Ahn et al. (2009), help bridge the gap between
behavior in an exogenously-imposed setting and the results when that situation arises outside the
laboratory. Unlike Clark and Riis (1998) or Moldovanu and Sela (2001), we do not address the
general theoretical optimality of these contests. Our experimental design focuses on
heterogeneity among contestants, by offering subjects the opportunity to enter contests against
opponents of varying skill levels. Our main result is that, given identical circumstances and the
same amount of prize funds available, a proportional-prize tournament elicits higher entry rates
and also higher total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The advantage of
proportional payments is in attracting entry and eliciting effort even where there is at least one
very strong player, whose presence in a winner-take-all setting can discourage other subjects
from entering. This robustness to heterogeneity among potential competitors is a key dimension
of contest performance, particularly for government and philanthropic contest sponsors who seek
to attract diverse new entrants into the pursuit of a common objective.

2. Experimental Design and Predictions
2.1. Experimental Design
We conduct an experiment with alternative payment incentives and compare performance
in a real effort task: adding up sets of five randomly generated two-digit numbers by hand, as
quickly as possible. Achievement is measured as the number of correct sums computed in a five
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minute period, with no assistance other than a pen and paper (no calculators). This task is
commonly used in the experimental literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Eriksson et al.,
2008) because it is easy to explain, and there is substantial variability in individual performance
that is due partly to skill and partly to effort. The task does not require previous experience and
high performance is not associated with a particular gender, socioeconomic background, or
physical conditioning.6
We study three payment conditions: piece-rate payments, a winner-take-all tournament,
and a proportional-prize tournament. In the simple piece-rate (PR) condition, subjects receive 2
experimental francs (equivalent to $0.40) per correct answer. In the winner-take-all (WTA)
tournament, four subjects within a group compete for a prize of 100 francs ($20) paid to the one
with the largest number of correct answers. In the proportional-prize (PP) tournament, four
subjects within a group compete for a fraction of that same-sized prize, paid proportionally to all
subjects according to their share of the group’s total number of correct answers. Note that the
contestant group size is held fixed at four in both cases.
The experiment used subjects drawn from the population of undergraduate students at
Purdue University. Computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory. A total of 93 subjects
participated in eight experimental sessions. Upon arrival the subjects were randomly assigned to
a computer. The experiment proceeded in four parts. All subjects were given written instructions,
available in the Appendix, at the beginning of each part, and an experimenter also read the
instructions aloud. In the first part, subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt

6

We are not aware of any evidence suggesting any learning effects in adding numbers task. Moreover, the results of
our experiment indicate that there is no such learning.
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and Laury (2002), for the purpose of eliciting subjects’ risk preferences.7 In the second part, each
subject participated in one period of adding up numbers under the PR treatment. Performance
was recorded and subjects received 2 experimental francs for each correct answer at the end of
the experimental session.
The third and fourth parts of the experiment involved WTA and PP contests. In two
initial experimental sessions, employing a total of 24 subjects, each subject was randomly and
exogenously assigned to compete in a WTA and a PP contest, in a varied sequence. In the next
six sessions, employing a total of 69 subjects, each subject chose whether they wanted to enter a
contest or be paid by PR.8 Our main focus is on the choices and performance of subjects during
those endogenous-entry sessions, in which their contest opponents were explicitly and
deliberately drawn from the pool of subjects in the previous sessions. Having each subject
compete against the pre-recorded scores of earlier contestants ruled out strategic interactions
among subjects within the same session, and also eliminates the potential influence of social
preferences. If we had not used historical competitors, social preferences could have affected
behavior because entry and greater effort impose a negative externality on contemporaneous
competitors. Competing against pre-recorded, historical performances also allowed us to assign
each subject to a four-player group in which their three competitors had higher or lower
performance, thereby exogenously manipulating their relative skill.9 Before each entry decision,
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Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff
with certainty, while option B was a lottery with payoff of either $3 or zero. The series of 15 lotteries offered
increasing odds of winning the $3 prize, from a 5% probability of winning to a 70% probability. The subject’s
willingness to forego option A in favor of option B reflects their risk preferences, at roughly the same scale of
wealth effect as the rest of our experiment.
8
Four sessions had 12 subjects each, one session had 11 subjects, and one session had 10 subjects. The number of
subjects in each session does not have to be a multiple of 4 since subjects compete against pre-recorded scores.
9
Assigning subjects to pre-determined group compositions obviously limits our ability to draw general conclusions
about the performance of WTA and PP. This design choice, however, allows us to avoid other potential problems
that arise when group size and composition are formed endogenously. For example, this approach controls for
(unobserved) beliefs about the skill and contest-induced effort intensity of potential competitors. It is also guided by
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subjects were shown the actual piece-rate scores of the three previous subjects against whom
they would compete, to inform their expectations about relative performance should they choose
to enter. The opponents’ prerecorded performance in the WTA and PP contests was not revealed,
however, until the subject’s performance was registered and their reward was computed.
Each subject participated in six five-minute periods, three with the opportunity to enter a
WTA contest and three with the opportunity to enter a PP contest. The sequence was varied so
that half the sessions had WTA contests offered first, and half had PP offered first. In each of
these six periods, subjects were matched with a fresh group of three other subjects, and informed
that their competitors’ scores had been recorded from an experimental session run earlier in the
year. The computer screen displayed the number of problems that each participant in the group
had solved in their initial PR payment condition. Subjects could then choose to enter the contest
available in that round (WTA or PP), or to be paid by PR for their own performance. We
interpret the PR choice in this design as the opportunity cost of entry, which varies across
subjects due to their heterogeneous skill. Non-entrants direct their effort to other activities, rather
than whatever is being encouraged by the contest. At the end of each period the computer
displayed the number of problems that each participant in the group solved correctly, and the
earnings outcome of that period.
At the end of each session, subjects were paid privately in cash: a show-up fee of $5,
their earnings from the risk elicitation task in part one, the piece-rate payments in part two, and
the contests or piece-rate payments chosen in parts three and four. From the risk-aversion part of
the experiment, one of the 15 lottery decisions was randomly selected for payment. From the

the theoretical properties of these two tournaments, summarized in the next section, which imply different entry
choices for participants with different relative ability. It would be interesting for future research to investigate
alternative designs in which subjects compete against others who have selected into the tournament, or can choose
which of the two tournament schemes to enter.
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second part of the experiment in which all payments were by piece rate, subjects were paid for
each correctly solved problem. For the third and fourth parts, subjects were paid their earnings
from one randomly selected period in part three and one randomly selected period in part four.
All earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 5 francs to $1. On average the subjects
earned $22 including the show-up fee, and sessions lasted about 75 minutes.

2.2. Predictions and Hypothesis
Equilibrium effort in tournaments is typically modeled following Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Hillman and Riley (1989). The approach in Lazear and Rosen (1981) leads to a
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Their model includes random noise and convex costs,
so that predicted efforts equate marginal costs with marginal gains. Hillman and Riley (1989)
assume that individual performance is a function of only effort, so the winner is simply the
player who expends the highest effort. In that setting, there is no pure strategy equilibrium, but
there is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which players randomize their efforts
over some interval.
Entry into tournament contests has been addressed only recently. Fullerton and McAfee
(1999) study a tournament where potential entrants have heterogeneous abilities and find that
often the efficient tournament attracts only the two players with the highest abilities. Comparing
different contests, Namoro and Mathews (2008) demonstrate that the high ability players do not
necessarily participate in the contest with the largest prize, but may choose one with a lower
prize instead.
To derive our main hypothesis, we consider a simple contest in which
players compete for a prize, normalized to

1. Player selects irreversible effort
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risk-neutral
, with the

marginal cost of effort

. Assume that all players have different costs (abilities) and that
…

marginal costs can be ordered as

0. The share of the prize (or probability of

winning) for player is defined by a contest success function:
,
where,

∑

.

(1)

is the parameter which describes the degree of discrimination. The contest is perfectly
∞, i.e. the player with the highest effort receives the entire prize

discriminatory when

1, each player receives the portion of the prize according to

(winner-take-all contest). When

the relative performance (proportional-prize).10 The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player is
equal to the expected prize (
,

,

times the prize valuation 1) minus cost of effort,
.

:
(2)

The Nash equilibrium depends on the parameter . For

1, the derivation of the

unique pure strategy equilibrium can be found in Fang (2002). In such a case, the equilibrium
effort for player is given by:

∑

For

∑

.

(3)

∞, the player who expends the highest effort wins the entire prize. The

equilibrium in such a winner-take-all contest is quite different from the proportional-prize
contest (Baye et al., 1996). In equilibrium all weaker players with marginal costs above
expend effort of zero with probability one. The two strongest players use mixed strategies, which

10

Technically speaking, the winner-take-all contest is an all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989) and the
proportional-prize contest is a lottery contest of Tullock (1980). Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between an allpay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989) and a winner-take-all tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981).
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are characterized by cumulative distribution functions that describe the distribution of efforts on
the support

0,

,
/

/

and

(4)

It is easy to verify that the expected payoffs (2) are positive for all players participating in
the proportional-prize contest and the expected payoff is positive only for the strongest player in
the winner-take-all contest (Baye et al., 1993, 1996; Fang, 2002; Ryvkin, 2007).11 Therefore, if
players have an outside option, as they do in our experiment, then the low ability players should
always choose not to enter the winner-take-all contest and instead choose the outside option. The
highest ability player will choose to participate in the winner-take-all contest if the outside option
is relatively small. We thus hypothesize that low ability players will enter PP significantly more
than WTA, while there should be no significant difference in entry decisions of high ability
players. Note that our experimental design tests this hypothesis directly, in that each potential
entrant’s outside option involves exactly the same skills and efforts as the tournament, but is
rewarded on a piece-rate basis instead of PP or WTA prizes.
Hypothesis: Subjects with a relatively low ability enter PP significantly more than WTA,
while there is no difference in entry for high ability subjects.

3. Results
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of performance for the two preliminary sessions when
subjects were placed exogenously in each type of contest. The primary purpose of those
preliminary sessions was to obtain some historical performance scores against which our subjects
would compete in the main experiment. There are two noticeable features of the data. First, the
11

It is possible that some players, whose costs are sufficiently high, may decide not to participate in the contest and
0. For specific condition under which such situation may occur see Fang (2002).
instead expend the effort of
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average number of problems solved by subjects in the WTA and PP is very similar (13.4 versus
13.6), which indicates that both tournaments generate similar incentives for subjects’
performance. Second, both histograms in Figure 1 indicate substantial variability in individual
performance (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008). This highlights an important
feature of this real effort task: subjects have different abilities and therefore they may have
different incentives to enter tournaments.
Figure 1 – Distribution of Performance with Exogenous on Tournament Entry
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3.1. Aggregate Performance
Table 1 summarizes the number of entry decisions, the total number of problems solved
correctly, and the total number of problems attempted in all treatments, conditional on whether
the subject chose to enter the tournament or accepted the outside option of a piece-rate payment.
A total of 85 entries were made when tournament payoffs were WTA, and jointly these subjects
solved 1077 problems correctly. By contrast, a total of 129 entries occurred with PP
tournaments, and the total number of problems they solved was 1509. Total achievement in the
tournament was thus 40 percent larger with PP payment than in WTA.
Result 1: PP attracts more subjects and has higher total performance than WTA.
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The rightmost column of Table 1 indicates that the WTA contest tended to attract more
able subjects. On average, the WTA entrants solved one more problem than the PP entrants. This
8.5 percent advantage in individual performance for WTA is noticeably smaller than the 40
percent advantage in aggregate total performance for the PP tournament. Even more importantly,
as we show in the next subsection the PP contest attracts entry by high performers at a
(statistically) equivalent rate as the WTA contest. The difference in individual performance
arises only because the WTA format discourages entry of relatively weaker performers.
For certain applications, such as a labor market context in which managers may be
selecting between alternative incentive schemes to motivate employees, the overall effort
performance comparison should include the PR effort. By this measure (labeled “Combined” in
Table 1) the two tournaments have nearly identical achievement. For our research objective to
evaluate the tournaments’ ability to redirect effort to specific activities by attracting entry into a
contest, the most relevant performance metric is the problems solved when participating in the
tournament.
Table 1 – Conditional Statistics in PR, WTA and PP (Endogenous-Entry Sessions)
Total Number of
Average Number
of Correctly
Entry
Correctly Solved Attempted
Observations
Problems
Problems Solved Problems
PR
69
661
893
9.6
WTA
85
1077
1342
12.7
PR (WTA)
122
1440
1796
11.8
Combined
207
2517
3138
12.2
PP
129
1509
1912
11.7
PR (PP)
78
1071
1281
13.7
Combined
207
2580
3193
12.5
Note: The first row shows unconditional PR results, required for all 69 subjects
before the contests were offered. The third and sixth rows show subjects’ PR
performance, conditional on having declined participation in the contest.
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3.2. Entry and Individual Performance
The overall achievement advantage of the PP tournament depends on subjects’ decision
to enter the tournament, which in turn depends on what they believe about their relative
performance vis-à-vis the competitors they would face. We assigned subjects to three kinds of
matches. In one third of cases, subjects were placed into a group with a “superstar” contestant,
defined as a subject whose PR scores were among the highest in the preliminary sessions. In
another third of the cases, subjects were placed in a group of relatively weak contestants, whose
PR scores were somewhat lower than the subject’s own initial PR score. In the remaining third
they were placed in a group of relatively strong contestants.
Table 2 – Fraction of Subjects Entering the Tournament
Matching
Against Superstar
Against Weaker Group
Against Stronger Group
Total

Performance in PR by other contestants
Maximum of others Average of others
22.0
11.5
8.4
7.4
16.4
14.1
15.6
11.0

Fraction of Entry
WTA
PP
0.07
0.51
0.91
0.93
0.25
0.43
0.41
0.62

Table 2’s first two columns show the matches, in terms of the maximum and the mean of
the three other contestants’ pre-recorded scores. The second two columns show entry decisions,
in terms of the fraction of subjects who chose to compete under each tournament option. The
most dramatic difference is seen when subjects know they face a superstar. In those cases, only 7
percent of subjects chose to enter contests with WTA payments, whereas 51 percent chose to
enter when the same prize amount was to be paid proportionally. When matched against weaker
groups, more than 90 percent of subjects entered both types of contests. When matched against a
stronger group (but no superstar), 25 percent entered the WTA contests and 43 percent entered
the contests with proportional payment. In total subjects enter 62 percent of the PP contests but
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only 41 percent of the WTA contests.
The entry decision could be influenced by learning over time, and could vary across
different types of subjects. Table 3 reports results of various probit random effect models to
evaluate this influence. Each one tests the influence of PP compared to WTA payment on
subjects’ decision to enter the contest. The regressions control for learning using the time trend
1/period and a dummy-variable controlling for the sequence in which the treatments were run.
Specification (1) uses all subjects in the endogenous entry condition, while specifications (2) to
(5) are based on different subsets of the data. Controlling for the time trend and sequence, the
probability of entering the contest is significantly higher when payment is PP rather than WTA.
This increase in entry likelihood for the PP contest is especially pronounced for the subjects
whose performance in the preliminary PR rounds was the lowest of their contest comparison
group (specification 3) or below the group’s average (specification 5). No significant difference
in entry likelihood is found for the subjects whose performance is the highest or higher than
average (specifications 2 and 4). This finding supports the main hypothesis of this study.

Table 3 – Entry into PP and WTA Contests by Initial Performance
Performance in PR treatment
All
is Max
is Min
is >= Mean
is < Mean
Dependent variable,
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Entry into Tournament
RE probit
RE probit
RE probit
RE probit
RE probit
PP dummy
0.54**
-0.15
0.60*
0.26
0.83**
[1 if PP treatment]
(0.13)
(0.40)
(0.23)
(0.18)
(0.18)
1/period
0.44*
-0.87
0.55
0.52
0.37
[time trend]
(0.22)
(0.70)
(0.41)
(0.32)
(0.32)
sequence dummy
0.06
0.37
0.02
0.04
0.11
[1 if WTA is before PP]
(0.13)
(0.42)
(0.25)
(0.18)
(0.18)
constant
-0.52**
2.00**
-1.02**
-0.56*
-0.52*
(0.18)
(0.63)
(0.36)
(0.25)
(0.25)
Observations
414
94
146
198
216
Number of subjects
69
50
68
33
36
Note: All results are from probit models with random subject effects. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Condition
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Result 2: PP encourages significantly more entry among low ability subjects than WTA
without discouraging the entry of high ability subjects.
Another question of interest is whether subjects’ performance depends on the type of the
contest or the contestants with whom they were matched. To address this we estimated several
random effect models with individual subject effects. The estimation results are shown in Table
4. The estimates in column (1) are based on the initial sessions with exogenous, compulsory
contest entry, and the other columns report estimates for those who chose to enter the contest.12
The dependent variable is the number of correctly solved problems (performance) and the
independent variables are the treatment dummy variable and controls for the time trend and
learning. The conclusion from all specifications is that subject’s performance is not influenced
by the type of the contest, since the PP dummy variable never even approaches statistical
significance.
Result 3: Individual performance is not significantly different in PP and WTA
tournaments, regardless whether the entry is exogenous or endogenous.
Results 1, 2, and 3 can be summarized as follows: as long as potential entrants expect to
face capable competitors, a proportional-prize tournament elicits higher entry rates and higher
total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament, by avoiding the discouragement effect
associated with contestant heterogeneity without otherwise altering individual performance.

12

We also estimated an alternative set of models following Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation procedure to
account for the endogenous selection into the tournament. In the first stage, we estimate the probit model as in Table
3, where the dependent variable is whether or not the subject chose the contest payment scheme. In the second stage
we use the results from the first stage to estimate the determinants of performance as in Table 4. Gender and the
subject’s estimated degree of risk-aversion were used as the identifying variables responsible for the selection effect,
based on theoretical predictions (for risk) and previous research documenting different tournament entry rates for
men and women (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). To conserve space we do not report these estimation results,
however, since they are very similar to the results reported in Table 4. We also estimated specifications that included
the abilities (initial piece rate performance) of the competitors, and this revealed that performance does not depend
on competitors’ abilities.
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Table 4 – Performance in PP and WTA Contests
Endogenous Contest Entry (columns 2-6)
Performance in PR treatment
Condition
Exogenous
is >=
All
is Max
is Min
is < Mean
Entry
Mean
Dependent variable,
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Performance
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
PP dummy
0.22
-0.04
-0.09
-0.62
0.21
-0.26
[1 if PP treatment]
(0.30)
(0.22)
(0.31)
(0.53)
(0.30)
(0.30)
1/period
-0.50
-0.31
-2.27**
-0.91
-0.91
0.05
[time trend]
(0.53)
(0.40)
(0.75)
(0.91)
(0.60)
(0.52)
sequence dummy
-2.22
0
-0.09
-0.21
-0.11
-0.28
[1 if WTA is before PP]
(1.96)
(0.82)
(0.96)
(1.01)
(1.00)
(0.76)
constant
14.83**
12.53**
14.85**
12.25**
15.29**
10.35**
(1.43)
(0.66)
(0.86)
(1.00)
(0.86)
(0.65)
Observations
144
214
87
55
92
122
Number of subjects
24
69
49
36
33
36
Note: All results shown are estimated using random subject effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Figure 2 – Distribution of Payoffs under WTA and PP
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Note also that, by design, the proportional-prize tournament reduces earnings inequality
relative to the winner-take-all tournament. Figure 2 displays the distribution of payoffs for the
WTA and PP tournaments, including PR payoffs received by subjects who chose not to enter the
contests. The stark win-or-lose structure of payoffs in the WTA tournament results in a few
winners who entered and earned all 100 francs, while a larger fraction of entrants lose and are
left with nothing. The contrast with the distribution of payoffs in the PP tournaments is striking.
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The average payoff for the WTA periods (32.7) is higher than in the PP periods (26.1), but the
payoff standard deviation is almost five times higher in the WTA (34.2 compared to 7.3).

3.3. Entry Decisions
The decision to enter a contest depends on the outside option and the payoff from entry.
In our experiment, the outside option is a piece-rate payment (PR): subjects receive a relatively
safe reward that depends only on their own performance. The payoff from entry depends on
performance relative to other contestants.
Table 5 examines subjects’ entry choices, separately considering each type of
tournament, using a series of random effect probit models. The significantly positive coefficient
on the subject’s own PR score in model (1) indicates that higher ability subjects enter WTA
contests more frequently than do low ability subjects, whereas no such skill selection effect
appears in model (2) for PP contests. Opponents’ skills also matter. With WTA payment, the
maximum_other score discourages entry, whereas in the PP contest the average_other score
discourages entry. This result is consistent with other players’ actual influence on the entrant’s
payoff based on these different contest structures. Although risk-averse subjects enter WTA less
frequently on average, the coefficient on a risk_averse dummy variable is not statistically
significant. As expected, no correlation exists between risk-aversion and entry into the PP
contests. Consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), the male dummy coefficient indicates
that men enter contests more frequently than women. This entry difference is only statistically
significant in the PP tournament, which had the larger number of entrants.
To determine whether subjects’ entry decisions are optimal, we need to model their
expectations of their contest payoff conditional on the information they have when making this
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Table 5 – Entry into Different Contest Formats by Initial Own and Competitor Abilities
Entry into Tournament
WTA
PP
WTA+PP
(1)
(2)
(3)
Specification
RE probit
RE probit
RE probit
own
0.17**
-0.01
0.16**
[own piece rate performance]
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.04)
maximum_other
-0.20**
-0.05
-0.19**
[max of the other three piece rates]
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.03)
average_other
-0.08
-0.19**
-0.08
[average of the other three piece rates]
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.06)
PP dummy
1.29
[1 if PP treatment]
(0.67)
own x PP dummy
-0.17**
[own if PP]
(0.05)
maximum_other x PP dummy
0.15**
[maximum_other if PP]
(0.04)
average_other x PP dummy
-0.11
[average_other if PP]
(0.07)
1/period
0.23
0.37
0.29
[time trend]
(0.44)
(0.36)
(0.27)
male dummy
0.24
0.59**
0.44**
[1 if male]
(0.26)
(0.21)
(0.16)
risk_averse dummy
-0.17
0.00
-0.07
[1 if # of safe options A > 8]
(0.26)
(0.21)
(0.16)
sequence dummy
0.4
-0.01
0.16
[1 if WTA is before PP]
(0.27)
(0.21)
(0.16)
constant
2.07**
2.81**
1.69**
(0.63)
(0.54)
(0.50)
Observations
207
207
414
Number of subjects
69
69
69
Note: All results shown are RE probit estimates, with subjects as the random effect.
Significance levels are: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Dependent variable

entry choice. At the time of their entry decisions, subjects know the initial piece rate
performances for themselves and for the three other contestants with whom they have been
matched. From that, they can observe the difference between their own initial piece rate score
and the highest of the others (for a WTA contest), and the difference between their own and the
average of the others (for a PP contest). These comparisons would influence an optimizing
subject’s beliefs about their expected payoff from entry. In making that forecast, a subject might
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also consider how they and others are likely to perform in subsequent rounds given those initial
piece rate scores. To ensure that these predictions turn out to be unbiased, we model subjects’
beliefs using rational expectations by regressing the payoff each subject would actually have
earned through contest entry in each round on their own and their competitors’ initial piece rate
performances.
For example, before his first entry choice subject 25 knew that his own piece rate
performance was 14 correctly solved problems, and that his three potential competitors solved
13, 15 and 21 problems on their initial piece rate task. It turns out that this subject then solved 20
problems correctly in the following period, while his three rivals solved 20, 20, and 23 problems.
If those results had occurred in a PP contest, the subject would have earned a share
20/(20+20+20+23)=0.24 of the 100 prize, or 24 experimental francs. If he had not entered, he
would have earned the piece-rate payment of 2x20=40 experimental francs. For our regression,
we calculate the payoffs that would have been realized in the PP contest for all 207 potential
entry choices, and combine them in an OLS regression of PP payoffs on the piece rate
information available at the time of the entry choice. The coefficient estimates from this
regression and initial piece rate performances tell us that subject 25 in this example period would
have an expected payoff of 22.54 experimental francs from PP contest entry, whereas with nonentry he would have earned an expected payoff of 32.27 experimental francs. For this period, an
entry decision would not have been optimal.
We employ a similar calculation to compute expected earnings from entering WTA
contests, except that we use a logit regression since the dependent variable is a binary indicator
for whether a subject would have actually won. The model estimates indicate the probability of
winning based on piece rate information available at the time of the entry choice, which we
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multiply by the prize value (100) to determine expected profits from entry. For example, using
this logit model subject 25 would have expected to win his third potential WTA contest (which
was against some relatively weak opponents) with probability 0.841, leading to an expected
contest payoff of 84.1. This exceeds what he would have expected to earn (30.97) from a PR
payment, making entry optimal in that period.
These estimates of expected contest payoffs reveal that subjects have made correct entry
choices a substantial majority of the time in both contests, with 86.05 percent correct in the WTA
contest and 68.6 percent correct in the PP contest. There is a bias towards over-entry rather than
under-entry in both contests. Subjects incorrectly enter the contest when an unbiased expectation
suggests that they would have earned more from the PR in 36 percent of their entries, but they
incorrectly stay out of the contest in only 8.5 percent of their non-entry choices. Thus, similar to
previous research (e.g., Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), subjects tend to overestimate their chances
of relative success and enter too frequently into tournaments.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) document that when choosing between compensation
schemes men selected tournament compensation twice as often as women.13 We find a smaller
but still significant difference. Overall men selected the tournament 56 percent of the time,
compared to 45 percent of the time for women.14 One possible explanation is that women enter
the tournament less than men because they tend to be more risk-averse (Eckel and Grossman,

13

While several studies replicate the result that women are less willing to enter contests (e.g., Niederle et al., 2008;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2005), this should not be interpreted as evidence that women are on average not as
competitive as men. In fact, the majority of studies in the auction literature that consider gender effects find that
women overbid more than men, suggesting more competitive behavior once in a competition (Chen et al., 2005;
Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007; Charness and Levin, 2009). Similar over-bidding behavior is found in
studies of lottery contests (Sheremeta, 2010).
14
Wilcoxon two-tailed p-value=0.02. This smaller gender effect does not contradict Niederle and Vesterlund’s
(2007) result, since many differences besides the subject pool exist between the two experimental environments
even though both feature the same real-effort task. For example, in our study we manipulate subjects’ information
about the relative abilities of their opponents; subjects compete for a single (total $20) prize rather than a piece rate
prize; and they had no knowledge about the gender of their competitors.
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2002; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). In our experiment 60 percent of
women and 52 percent of men are classified as risk-averse, but this difference is not significant
(Wilcoxon p-value=0.52). Furthermore, the Table 5 estimates control for risk-aversion and yet
still find a significant gender difference on entry. Note also that the gender difference for entry is
larger and is statistically significant for the less risky PP contest. Thus, it appears that some
alternative explanation for this gender difference, such as greater overconfidence among men as
suggested by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), may be behind the more frequent entry by men.
Our analysis of over- and under-entry summarized in the previous paragraph does not reveal any
gender differences for the WTA contest; however it does indicate a marginally significant
difference for the PP contest, indicating less frequent entry by women when the contest provides
higher expected profit than the PR payment.15

4. Conclusions
McKinsey and Company (2009) describe how philanthropic and government-sponsored
contests have become increasingly widespread instruments used to elicit efforts targeting many
social goals and public goods. Almost all of these contests are winner-take-all in nature. Market
incentives may also resemble such contests: in a book titled The Winner-Take-All Society, Frank
and Cook (1996) argue that in the 1980s and early 1990s the U.S. economy became increasingly
dominated by a stark win-or-lose structure of payoffs. Such “high powered incentives” are
sometimes desirable, and are sometimes inevitable, but in some cases offering rewards to more
winners might lead to preferable outcomes. That possibility has been explored in theoretical and
15

When the PP contest offered subjects a higher expected profit than PR payment, men actually entered the contest
87 percent of the time (in 62 out of 71 such cases), whereas women actually entered only 70 percent of the time (in
19 of 27 such cases). This gender difference is marginally significant (p-value=0.052), when the entry choice for
these cases is modeled as a logit function of gender and a time trend, for the subset of cases where the PP contest has
a higher expected profit.

21

experimental studies such as Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), Che and Gale (2003), Müller
and Schotter (2009), and Sheremeta (2010).
This paper introduces a new type of tournament in which every contest entrant wins a
prize, the value of which is strictly proportional to their share of total achievement. We find that
such a proportional-prize contest elicits higher entry rates and thus higher total performance in
the contest than an equivalent winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize tournament
performs better because of greater participation by subjects with relatively low ability, with no
change in the entry rates or performance of high ability subjects. Moreover, the proportionalprize tournament also substantially reduces earnings inequality relative to the winner-take-all
tournament.
Our experiment varies the relative skill of each subject by exogenously matching them
with prerecorded scores from a pool of previous competitors. This isolates the impact of relative
skills, to test whether a proportional-prize design can overcome the discouraging effect of
heterogeneity in winner-take-all contests. Future work might consider other important issues,
such as strategic interaction among contestants, or the effect of voluntary entry on subsequent
performance. Regarding relative skills, consistent with theory we find that subjects are indeed
discouraged from entering winner-take-all contests when they face a single much stronger (or
luckier) potential opponent, whereas with proportional prizes their entry decision is influenced
by the average performance of all other competitors.
At least for this laboratory contest environment, the proportional-prize contest is just as
effective as the winner-take-all contest in identifying top performers because they enter both
contests at the same rate and perform equally well conditional on entry. If a contest sponsor,
employer or governing body has the additional goal to raise total aggregate performance - rather
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than just identifying the top performer - our results suggest that the higher entry rates in the
proportional prize contest give it a distinct advantage over the winner-take-all format.
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